Private computation is a generalization of private information retrieval, in which a user is able to compute a function on a distributed dataset without revealing the identity of that function to the servers that store the dataset. In this paper it is shown that Lagrange encoding, a recently suggested powerful technique for encoding Reed-Solomon codes, enables private computation in many cases of interest. In particular, we present a scheme that enables private computation of polynomials of any degree on Lagrange encoded data, while being robust to Byzantine and straggling servers, and to servers that collude in attempt to deduce the identities of the functions to be evaluated. Moreover, incorporating ideas from the well-known Shamir secret sharing scheme allows the data itself to be concealed from the servers as well. Our results extend private computation to non-linear polynomials and to data-privacy, and reveal a tight connection between private computation and coded computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Private Information Retrieval (PIR) protocol, a dataset is stored in a possibly coded manner across a number of servers, and a user is able to download a single file from the dataset while keeping the identity that file hidden from the servers. Private Computation (PC) is a generalization of PIR wherein the user wants to not just privately download a file from the database, but privately compute an arbitrary function of it. In PC, privacy refers to hiding the identity of the function to be computed. One recovers the PIR problem from the PC problem by specifying to functions given by coordinate projections.
In both PC and PIR, the user employs randomness to generate a query for each server in the system. These queries are sent to the servers, and in turn each server responds with a deterministic function of its query and its stored data. The user must be able to retrieve the desired outcome from these responses. To guarantee privacy, the queries must not reveal anything, in the information-theoretic sense, about the identity of the file to be downloaded (in PIR) or the function to be computed (in PC). The rate of both PC and PIR is defined as the ratio between the amount of required data and the amount of downloaded data. The capacity is defined as the supremum of rates among all schemes that comply with the problem definition.
For functions which are linear combinations of the files, PC was studied in [6, 12] for uncoded databases, and in [7, 8] for coded databases. The case of non-linear functions, and especially polynomial functions of degree larger than one, was studied by the second author in [5] , where a PC scheme was constructed for polynomial functions on systematically coded databases, an approach that incurs lower rates in many scenarios and is not resilient against straggling or Byzantine servers (see [9, Sec. V] for detailed comparison).
The term Coded Computation (CC) broadly refers to a family of techniques in which redundancy is added to datasets, in order to alleviate various issues that arise in distributed computations. Coded computing of general polynomials has been addressed recently in [15] , which is tightly connected to our results. In [15] it was shown that coding the data by using the well-known Lagrange polynomials can amend issues of resiliency, security, and privacy in many tasks of interest.
We present a Private Computation scheme for the evaluation of degree G polynomials on K data vectors x k ∈ F M q that are stored across N servers. For integers E and T , the data vectors are encoded using an [N, K + E] Reed-Solomon code, the scheme hides the identity of the polynomials to be computed from any T colluding servers, and hides the contents of the data vectors x k from any E colluding servers. For integers P and A, the scheme is robust against any P stragglers (that fail to respond in a timely manner) and any A adversaries (that respond with purposely erroneous computations). The scheme requires that N − (G(K + E − 1) + T + P + 2A) > 0, and has PC rate
The scheme construction borrows ideas from Coded Computation, especially those of [15] . Our methods involve identical encoding to that of [15] , and the same mechanism to guarantee the privacy of the data. In particular, data storage is realized by evaluating interpolating polynomials, which allows the evaluation of polynomials on encoded data to be viewed as the evaluation of a single variable polynomial. This singlevariable polynomial is the composition of two polynomial functions of known degree, and its degree can therefore be calculated explicitly. This degree serves as crucial knowledge for the scheme construction and rate calculation.
A. Comparison with Previous Work
The scheme construction presented here also generalizes some ideas from [14] to deal with non-linear functions and data privacy. In the case of E = 0 and G = 1 the current scheme achieves a rate of
If we restrict our scheme to the case where the functions of interest are coordinate projections rather than degree G polynomials, then we reduce to the case of the PIR problem, and (2) matches the rate of [14] . If one further assumes that P = A = 0, one achieves a rate of
which is that of [3] . The rate (3) is also the asymptotic rate (as the number of files M → ∞) of [8] when T = 1, which studies linear computations of coded databases. In all cases where E = 0 and the PIR or PC capacity C is known, the current scheme achieves the asymptotic capacity as the number of files grows, that is, R = lim M →∞ C.
The capacity for the case E > 0 is subtler. The case of K = 1, G = 1, P = A = 0 is that of [4] , which studies the PIR problem under the constraints of T -function privacy and E-data privacy, for storage systems in which every server stores an amount of data which is comparable to the entire dataset. In [4] , the authors show that
where C is the PIR capacity of this setting, and use a technique they deem Cross Subspace Alignment to construct an explicit scheme which achieves the above rate. The rate R we achieve in this scenario is
whenever N > E + T , which is strictly worse than that of [4] when E > 0. This essentially stems from the fact that it is not clear how to align the noise terms arising from the functionprivacy randomness and data-privacy randomness as in [4] for non-linear functions. Thus our PC scheme leaves room for improvement in the case of non-trivial data privacy.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let P M,G denote the set of all polynomials with coefficients in F q in M variables with total degree at most G, that is,
Note that P M,G is a finite-dimensional vector space over F q and therefore supports a uniform distribution. The parameter M will be of less interest to us in general and hence we will often write P G for P M,G . Further, for an integer N we denote [N ] {1, 2, . . . , N }.
Given parameters N , K, q ≥ N , and some α = (α 1 , . . . , α N ) consisting of distinct elements α n ∈ F q , we construct the [N, K] Reed-Solomon code RS K (α) over F q as the image of the evaluation map
where F q [z] <K stands for the set of all univariate polynomials of degree less than K in the variable z over F q . We will be particularly interested in Lagrange Encoding [15] of RS K (α), in which we choose some β = (β 1 , . . . , β K ) consisting of distinct β k ∈ F q . If a = (a 1 , . . . , a K ) ∈ F K q is a message vector, define u a,β ∈ F q [z] <K by the property u a,β (β k ) = a k for all k = 1, . . . , K, and define the encoding a → ev(u a,β ). It is an easy exercise to verify that the image of this map is indeed RS K (α).
We consider the problem of Private Computation on distributed storage systems of the following type; this follows a standard setup in the PIR literature, see [1, 3, 13] . Let
and the vector y n is stored on server n. Given the above setup, a user wishes to compute φ b (x k ) for some functions φ 1 , . . . , φ B , for all k = 1, . . . , K. We assume that the functions φ b all belong to some (necessarily
To accomplish this goal, the user sends S queries ρ (1) n , . . . , ρ (S) n ∈ S to the n-th server, who responds with the answers ρ
n (y n ). From all N S answers, the user must be able to decode the desired function evaluations:
It is useful to think of the above as happening over S rounds or iterations, so that during the s-th round the user queries the servers with the functions ρ (s) n and obtains the answers ρ (s) n (y n ). Similarly, it is useful to think of the parameter B as analogous to the block length of a file in traditional PIR. We view the parameters B and S as free for the user to adjust to maximize their download rate. Here the terms φ b (x k ) are random variables in the sense that the contents of the database are, to the user, unknown and therefore best treated as random. The terms ρ (s) n (y n ) are random variables in the sense that the queries ρ (s) n are sampled according to some distribution. Our primary function space of interest is S = P G , the space of polynomial functions of total degree at most G from
For any T -subset T = {n 1 , . . . , n T } of [N ], we let ρ T be the joint distribution of all ρ 
That is, a PC scheme has T -function-privacy if the identities of the functions φ 1 , . . . , φ B to be computed remain private even after any T of the servers collude to attempt to deduce the identities of the φ b . A PC scheme has E-data-privacy if
That is, the servers in the distributed storage system remain oblivious to the content of the uncoded data, even if E of them collude to attempt to deduce the identities of the x k .
A PC scheme is robust against P stragglers or unresponsive servers if the user is still able to decode the values φ b (x k ) even if, during any single round of the scheme, up to P servers respond with an erasure symbol ? instead of the true answer ρ where (s) is a vector containing at most P erasure symbols ? and at most A non-zero elements of F q . Here the erasure symbol is understood to be absorbing with respect to addition, in the sense that x+? =? for all x ∈ F q . See [2, 11, 14] for more on PIR from systems with stragglers and adversaries.
Given a PC scheme, our principal metric of efficiency will be the download rate, also referred to as the PC rate or simply rate, which is defined to be R = KB N S . That is, the rate R is the number of desired function evaluations φ b (x k ) the user obtains, divided by the total number of function evaluations ρ (s) n (y n ) downloaded. We aggregate all of the important parameters of our system in Table I. Due to space constraints, much of the details and proofs below are drastically abbreviated, and the curious reader is referred to the online version of this paper [9] .
III. A GENERAL CONSTRUCTION
In this section we present the main Private Computation scheme of the paper. With the system parameters as in Table I , the rate of the scheme is as given in (1). We begin by defining the encoding procedure and the basic scheme outline, and later continue to specific parameter choices and to the decoding process. The encoding process, including the data-privacy guarantees, are taken verbatim from [15] . Let x k ∈ F M q for k = 1, . . . , K be the K data vectors, and let
for e = 1, . . . , E.
Notice that u X (z) can be seen as either a collection of M univariate polynomials over F q , or equivalently, as a univariate polynomial over F M q ; for brevity, we adopt the latter of the two throughout this paper. By basic facts about polynomial interpolation, we have deg(u X (z)) ≤ K + E − 1. We now choose an evaluation vector α = (α 1 , . . . , α N ) ∈ F N q where the α n are all distinct and non-zero, and set y n = u X (α n ), which is then stored on server n = 1, . . . , N . If we further have {β k } k∈[K] ∩ {α n } n∈[N ] = ∅, then by iterating ideas from the Shamir secret sharing scheme [10] it can be shown that E-data privacy is obtained, and a proof sketch is given in Section IV.
To The scheme will evaluate φ b (x k ) for B functions φ b ∈ P G . This will be accomplished by downloading all coefficients of γ b (z) φ b (u X (z)), and then evaluating the γ b (z) on the β k . We have deg(γ b (z)) ≤ G(K+E−1), and thus L is the number of coefficients we need to download to completely determine a single γ b (z). As the individual coefficients of γ b (z) will also play a role in the scheme construction, we define γ b by
The parameter W is defined so that the user will download W unique coefficients γ b during each round of the scheme.
We define some ζ
. . , B and s = 1, . . . , S, whose precise nature will be made clear shortly. We also choose ψ (s) t ∈ P G to be i.i.d. uniform random elements, which are chosen anew during each round. For n = 1, . . . , N , set
Here ρ (s) n is transmitted to the n-th server during the s-th round, who responds with ρ (s) n (y n ). Since T random functions are combined into ρ (s) n in each round, it can be proved that T -function privacy is guaranteed, and a proof is given in Section IV. We define the s-th response polynomial r (s) (z) ∈ F q [z] to be
and thus the evaluation vector of z W δ (s) (z), which contains only randomness, lives in a subspace of F N q of dimension
During the s-th round, the user observes the vector ev(r (s) (z)) + (s) , where (s) is a vector which contains at most P erasure symbols, coming from the P stragglers, and at most A arbitrary elements of F q , coming from the A adversaries. This will allow the user to decode the coefficients of 1, z, . . . , z W −1 in r (s) (z), which will come from the terms in
The general expression for r (s) (z) will be of the form
i=−C , and some C which can depend on the round index s. The assumption that α n = 0 for all n guarantees that ev(r (s) (z)) is a well-defined element of F N q . During the s-th round, the decoding process roughly proceeds as follows. The user subtracts off the evaluation vectors of a The scheme construction will guarantee that the sets A (s) = {a (s) i | i = 0, . . . , W − 1} of coefficients decoded during round s each consist of W unique coefficients of the polynomials γ b (z). That is, A (s) ∩ A (t) = ∅ for s = t, and since each has size W , the user will have decoded W S = BL unique coefficients of the B polynomials γ b (z) at the end of the scheme. Since this is all of the coefficients of these polynomials, the user can reconstruct all γ b (z) entirely, and therefore compute γ b (β k ) = φ b (u X (β k )) = φ b (x k ) for all b = 1, . . . , B and all k = 1, . . . , K. One can verify that the PC rate is therefore as stated in (1) . 
A. Construction of ζ
and let ζ (s) (z) be the s-th row of ζ(z). We start by defining integers Q 1 and U 1 by using Euclidean division to write
We present ζ (1) (z) and the decoding process in the first round, and then provide a recursive definition of ζ (s) b (z) which works for every s = 2, . . . , S.
The response polynomial r (1) (z) is then of the form
First, note that
that alongside (6) implies that the evaluation vector of r (1) (z) lives in RS N (α), which is an MDS code with parameters [N, N , P + 2A + 1] and can thus correct P erasures and A errors contained in the vector (s) . After the erasure/error correction, the user is left with the evaluation vector of r (1) (z), which determines r (1) (z) completely. Since deg(γ b (z)) ≤ L for all b, the coefficients of 1, z, . . . , z W −1 of the above allow the user to decode all of the coefficients of γ 1 (z), . . . , γ Q1 (z), and the first U 1 coefficients of γ Q1+1 (z). That is, A (1) = {γ 10 , . . . , γ Q1+1,U1−1 }.
2) Round s = 2, . . . , S: Having already defined U s−1 and Q s−1 , we define Q s to be the maximal integer such that −U s−1 + (Q s − Q s−1 )L ≤ W , and then set
Lastly, define U s by the equation
In round s − 1, the user decoded the first U s−1 coefficients of γ Qs−1 (z). The response polynomial r (s) (z) can therefore be written as , which suffices to reconstruct all of these polynomials. The scheme construction is therefore complete.
IV. PROOFS OF PRIVACY
The perfect privacy guarantees in the this paper can be seen as special case of the Shamir secret sharing scheme [10] . By now a classic result, the Shamir secret sharing scheme allows N parties to share L secrets, such that any set of at most X parties cannot infer anything about the secrets, and any set of at least X + L parties can reconstruct all L secrets. The Shamir scheme relies on linear encoding of the following form. Let s 1 , . . . , s L ∈ F M ×1 q be the secrets. An external trusted party generates X random vectors t 1 , . . . , t X ∈ F M ×1 q , and performs linear encoding Since a function in P G can be seen as a vector over F q , it follows from (5) that the query functions are of the following form. 
